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HOW ETHICS COMMITTEES
MAY GO WRONG

here are many ways in which ethics committees (ECs) may function sub-optimally or in a way that
does harm. A number of these actions
on the part of ECs have been noted in
the literature. Recently, for example, Fox,
Myers, and Pearlman (2007) surveyed
several ECs and reported two remarkable findings. First, many committees
take votes. Second, many make single
recommendations. Both practices are
ethically problematic when competing
values are at stake because they may
result in the moral biases of a majority
of EC members overriding the values of
patients or their loved ones. As Fiester
has stated, such an EC’s recommendation
is, at best, “its best guess,” and this is not
a good enough rationale to dictate the
course for a patient (Feister, 2007, p. 32).
The practice of making a single recommendation may reflect a failure to
understand the most basic limitations of
ethics. That is, ethical analysis often cannot determine which of competing clinical choices is more “right” than another.
For example, it cannot determine when,
if ever, it is right to have an abortion.
The reason for this is that the two values
most at stake are mutually exclusive, and
ethical analysis simply cannot determine
which value, preserving potential human life or protecting a woman’s bodily
privacy, should prevail.
The implication of this limitation for
ECs is far reaching. In the vast majority
of ethical dilemmas in which competing,
mutually exclusive value conflicts are at

stake, ethical analysis cannot say which
single course of action should prevail.
What it can say is what kinds of arguments most warrant moral weight, and
whether all the arguments that should be
“on the table” have been identified.
In most cases, what ECs should offer
is acceptable ethical options. What they
should not do is offer single recommendations, particularly when these have
been decided by a vote. The moral flaw
in an EC voting is hopefully self-evident:
how this vote turns out may depend on
any number of factors, many of which
are highly arbitrary. These arbitrary
factors may include who happens to be
present at a given meeting and what these
persons’ views on the issues before them
happens to be.
Patients, their loved ones, and others
personally involved in a case may justifiably experience rage when an EC votes
and then tells the patient, family members, or clinicians what they should do.
This rage was experienced and expressed
by many in a recent case I learned of involving a hospital EC that was faced with
the question of what to do in regard to a
severely impaired newborn. The committee voted and then indicated that in
its “view” the infant’s doctors should do
all they could to maintain the child’s life.
Many of the pediatricians at the hospital
strongly disagreed.
The source of the rage was that the EC
had gone beyond what ethical analysis
could determine. Further, since the EC
had “declared” this, it was much more
Cont. on page 2
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he West Virginia Network of
Ethics Committees (WVNEC)
is collaborating with MHECN on a
conference on May 14, 2008, entitled,
“More is Not Always Better: Seeking
Value in End-of-Life Care.” MHECN
members will receive a 20% discount on
registration fees for this conference, which
will take place in Morgantown, VA. Visit
www.hsc.wvu.edu/chel/wvnec/ for more
information, or contact Cindy Jamison at:
(877) 209-8086, e-mail cjamison@hsc.
wvu.edu.

How Ethics Committees May Go Wrong
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difficult for the parents and staff to go
any other way!
ECs may miss seeing this potential flaw in their ethical reasoning, as
well as the negative consequences of
their using this reasoning to declare
what should be done. This oversight
may stem from the false conclusion
that if a single EC recommendation
is appropriate in one case, it is appropriate for all cases. Providing a
single recommendation in some cases
is wholly reasonable. For example, in
another case in which I was involved,
a doctor would not write a Do-NotResuscitate (DNR) order requested by
his patient. The patient had cancer and
chemotherapy had not been successful.
His physician believed that the patient
still had some chance to be cured by a
chemotherapy trial. The physician also
believed that when the patient entered
the hospital and accepted his care, the
patient implicitly was agreeing to the
doctor making this decision on his
behalf. The EC felt, in this case, that it

had to intervene.
The actual outcome illustrates an option ECs should keep in mind. An EC
member resolved this impasse wholly
by meeting with this doctor informally
over coffee. In this example, it seemed
apparent to all on this EC that the physician had no morally justifiable reason
to refuse to write the DNR order for
this patient. In this case, it may be that
since the physician’s action was unjustifiable, the EC had a moral obligation
to act on the basis of its moral judgment, and to intervene. In other cases,
the EC's moral obligation may be just
the opposite; namely, to not make a
single recommendation when there is
more than one reasonable option.
But what should an EC do when
reasonable persons identify more than
one ethically appropriate response to a
values conflict, whether or not all the
committee members around the table
happen to share the same view? They
may best serve the relevant stakeholders by shifting the question from what

the right answer is to who should decide. Most often, this decision should
be left to those most closely involved.
Parents should generally make decisions when the patient is their own
child. The moral wrong to be avoided
here is for ECs to make these decisions themselves, when those who
should make these decisions are others
more closely involved with the patient
and his or her care.
This ethically unwarranted usurping of patients and loved ones’ rightful roles also occurs among ethics
consultants, sometimes outside their
conscious awareness. Watkins and
colleagues (2007) describe a case
involving a physician who requested
an ethics consult for a patient who
was gravely ill. The physician favored
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (LST) for this patient, while the
family favored continuing LST. The
consultant repeatedly offered the family reassurance. However, when the
family requested continuing LST for
the patient, the consultant responded
by asking the physician to review
the patient's grim prognosis (what
Watkins and colleagues call the “dire
scenario”).
In this situation, the ethics consultant tried to persuade the family to
make a particular choice, not because
it was the only ethically justifiable
choice, but because the ethics consultant believed it was the right choice.
When ethical analysis cannot determine which of reasonable, competing,
mutually exclusive values should prevail, it is arbitrary to identify only one
choice as being right. So, what does
the EC offer in such cases? It should
offer the widest range of sound different views and an extensive process of
debate and deliberation—much like a
jury, although without a single verdict.
On a related topic, ECs go wrong
when their members knowingly or
unknowingly take on a role as “enforcers” of their hospital’s institutional

needs or “hidden agendas.” In those
cases, ECs’ agendas shift from providing a broader and richer analysis of the
relevant ethical issues, to influencing
patients or their loved ones to comply.
In general, ECs should meet patients’
and families’ needs over the interests
of their institution.
An example of such a hidden agenda
is a staff member seeking an EC’s help
in persuading patients or their loved
ones to stop using up limited resources such as blood, or an ICU bed.
ECs faced with such hidden agendas
should, of course, spot them and then
consider refusing, since this is not their
appropriate role. If they choose to take
on these agendas, they should make
it clear to patients and/or their loved
ones that this is what they are “up to,”
and what the hospital staff is asking
them to do. This transparent approach
respects the patient’s and family’s
dignity by ECs not engaging in deceit.
Patients and their loved ones, once
accurately informed in these instances,
may understandably refuse to be involved in further such discussions.
The value of the EC lies in its ability
to provide the most relevant facts and
the best moral reasoning that can be
“on the table.” This greatest potential
of EC’s suggests two practical goals
that all ECs should pursue. First, they
should strive to be sure that all members present are heard. Second, they
should strive to provide time—or some
other means—of being able to insure
that this occurs.
Commonly, members “higher”
on the “medical hierarchy,” such as
attending physicians and committee chairs, tend to speak most during
committee discussions, and others say
less, in part, because they may feel
intimidated. I can recall, for example,
numerous times during which I have
remained silent through most of a
discussion, only to finally speak. Once
I spoke, others who had been silent

until that time echoed my comments,
perhaps feeling safer to say what they
felt.
All EC members and chairs should
take personal responsibility to insure
that those with “less power” can
speak. If all members do this, unprecedented group upheaval may initially
result. However, this upheaval may be
unavoidable for the EC to be able to
achieve the most desirable end result.
In sum, ECs have the capacity
both to help and to harm patients.
Their capacity to harm arises, in part,
from several pitfalls discussed here.
These include making single recommendations when there is more
than one ethically reasonable option,
voting, adopting a hidden agenda,
and responding in ways that overly
influence or even determine patient
outcomes, when other options may
be ethically reasonable. Hopefully, if
members are aware of such pitfalls,
they can better avoid them.
Edmund G. Howe, MD, JD
Professor, Department of Psychiatry
Director, Program in Medical Ethics
Senior Scientist, Center for the Study
of Traumatic Stress, USUHS
Bethesda, MD
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EDITORIAL: DISABILITY RIGHTS AND MEDICAL ETHICS

n 2007 hundreds of articles
were written about the Ashley
Treatment—the subject of Anita
J. Tarzian’s article “Disability and
Slippery Slopes” (Mid-Atlantic Ethics
Committee Newsletter, Spring 2007).
Over the course of the year thousands
of people turned to the internet for
more information about Ashley X.
Despite the tremendous interest in what
was done to Ashley X, no mainstream
press outlets have presented or delved
into what disability rights activists have
to say about the case. Medical ethics
committees and medical commentators
have been virtually silent as well. I find
this alarming, in part because disability
rights activists, disability studies
scholars, and disability related blogs
have been abuzz with activity and are,
literally, one click away on the internet
(for example, see disstud.blogspot.com/
and http://notdeadyetnewscommentary.
blogspot.com/). There are, of course,
a few exceptions, but to the best of
my knowledge, Tarzian is alone in
her effort as a medical ethicist to
understand the Ashley Case from a
disability rights perspective. Tarzian
is to be commended for connecting
the ethical dimensions of the Ashley
Treatment and the civil rights of
disabled people in this country and
beyond. However, there are elements
of her discussion that I strongly
disagree with—specifically her
position that the rights of those with
cognitive and physical disabilities are
fundamentally different.
Before I outline my reasons for
why I, a disability rights activist and
scholar, strenuously object to Tarzian’s
attempt to separate the rights of those
with cognitive and physical disabilities,
let me start by stating that we do share
some common ground. American society is inherently biased against those
with disabilities—both cognitive and
physical. This inherent bias has a direct
impact on medical decision-making
strategies. The Ashley Treatment is an
 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

extreme example of this. I agree with
Tarzian that marginalized people or
those who have been ignored should
not only be included but also play an
active role on medical ethics boards.
For example, disabled, transgendered,
and conjoined populations to name
just three should be given a voice, as
they have been and remain well outside
contemporary power structures.
Tarzian and I also agree that every
effort should be made to maximize the
autonomy and opportunities for those
with any given disability. Here is where
our views begin to diverge in tone and
scope. Equality is the starting point for
any discussion of disability rights—it
is not a choice nor is it something that
society should “strive for” as Tarzian
puts it. The fact is, it is the law and has
been since the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed seventeen
years ago. Yet, blatant discrimination
and outright bigotry remain common
place for people with disabilities. It is
something I face every time I leave my
home for work or go to school to pick
up my son. It impacts every facet of my
life. In my experience, the civil rights
of disabled people are perceived as
somehow different in the United States.
When this is combined with repressive
Supreme Court decisions, particularly
the Sutton Trilogy [Albertson’s Inc. v.
Kirkingburg (1999) 527 US 555, 199
S Ct 2162; Murphy v. UPS (1999) 527
US 516, 119 S Ct 2133; Sutton v. United Airlines (2002) 527 US 471, 199
S Ct 2139], our country’s record in support of the rights of disabled people is
abysmal. This is, in part, why Tarzian’s
effort to establish a distinction between
the rights of people with a physical and
cognitive disability, though well intentioned, has ominous implications in the
aftermath of the Ashley X case. It is
also reflective of a Supreme Court that
can and does deem people either “too
disabled” or not “disabled enough”
to be eligible for protection under the
ADA.

Tarzian acknowledges disabled
people have every right to “feel threatened and frustrated by others false assumptions about their rights, worth and
abilities.” She also acknowledges and
condemns past abuses, most notably
the Eugenics movement that resulted
in the death and forced sterilizations
of thousands of people in this country.
This condemnation is nice but does not
help Ashley X or me when I interact
with others, many of whom pity my
existence or assume I am physically
and cognitively disabled. There is no
“fuzzy logic” here—discrimination
hurts Ashley X just as much as it hurts
me. At issue are the civil rights of
those least able to protect themselves,
and in my opinion the most stigmatized and devalued members of our
society. Surely, the medical community
and American society in general can
do better. And while I acknowledge
things have gotten better, I also am
cognizant that it was just thirty years
ago that people like Ashley X and all
those with a cognitive disability would
have been forced into an institution
like the notorious Willowbrook. For
decades, it was thought that institutionalization was in the best interests of
the parents, family, and child. Doctors,
nurses, and social workers all recommended institutionalization. No parent,
it was thought, could handle caring for
a cognitively disabled child—an argument based on stigma, fear, and public
sentiment. The institutionalization of
those with cognitive disabilities was
the norm. In 1967, at its peak, as many
as 100,000 children were institutionalized in 162 state facilities across the
country. Conditions at these facilities
were horrific, and in retrospect, we
know there was no medical reason for
institutionalization.
Tarzian acknowledges two models for
disability exist—medical and social—
but wonders if the term “disabled” used
to describe Ashley X and others like her
is a misnomer. For me, this is an indica-

tion of how distorted the social perception of disability remains in the medical
community. Tarzian is not alone and is
in good company. The Supreme Court is
equally confused because their decisions have gutted the ADA—literally
torn out the heart of the legislation’s
intent. Like it or not, disability is first
and foremost a social construct. The
vast majority of disabled people are
oppressed—66% are unemployed and
very few have adequate health insurance. Disabled people are keenly aware
that medical and ethical decisions are
not made in a vacuum. Stigma still figures significantly in the social construction of disability and the treatment of
disabled people. Even Hollywood has
gotten into the act with what disability
rights activists characterize as “dis-

M

ability snuff films.” Here I refer to films
like the highly acclaimed Million Dollar
Baby. This film delivered a clear message that tapped into the basest elements
of humanity in which death was preferable to permanent disability. I recall seeing this movie in the theatre and being
shocked that people cheered when the
main character was killed. These same
cheering people seemed embarrassed by
my presence and refused to look me in
the eye as they left the theatre.
The medical, legal and ethical
systems, past and present, have consistently failed to protect people with
physical and cognitive disabilities. The
governmental, medical, and social infrastructure needed to protect the rights
of all disabled people remains woefully
inadequate. This has led some legisla-

tors to initiate the ADA Restoration
Act—an effort that has gone virtually
unreported. This is a move in the right
direction for the civil rights of disabled
people in this country. It is a progressive move, one that acknowledges past
abuses and contemporary failures. In
contrast, I worry about Tarzian and
other medical ethicists who want to
separate the civil rights of people with
cognitive disabilities from those with
a physical disability. I understand the
medical needs of those with a cognitive
disability and physical disability are different, but their civil rights—their status
as human beings—is identical.
William J. Peace, PhD
Independent Scholar
Katonah, N.Y.
http://badcripple.blogspot.com/

TARZIAN'S RESPONSE TO PEACE'S EDITORIAL

y intent in the article Dr.
Peace refers to was not to
draw distinctions between
persons with physical and cognitive disabilities. Rather, I intended to make the
following two points: “Disabled” does
not appear to accurately describe the
status of individuals who are irreversibly unconscious (like Terri Schiavo) or
irreversibly neurologically devastated
(like Ashley X). Holding these cases up
as paradigmatic of a “disability rights”
agenda seems to reinforce the negative
stereotypes that “able-bodied” (and
minded) persons project onto persons
with disabilities (both physical and
cognitive).
The “Ashley Treatment” can certainly be judged unethical based on a
slippery slope argument (i.e., that while
it may not have harmed Ashley, its
acceptance will harm others by facilitating misapplication to individuals
with less profound neurological impairments). But critics tried to denounce
the "Ashley Treatment" using slippery
slope arguments disguised as individual benefits-burdens analyses. That

is, rather than argue that the harms to
Ashley of the hormones and surgery
she received outweighed the benefits
to her, opponents argued that harms toward others if the “Ashley Treatment”
gained acceptance didn’t outweigh
benefits toward Ashley and her family.
I accept the slippery slope argument,
but have not been convinced that individual harms to Ashley outweigh benefits to her and her family, particularly
since the “treatments” (“yuk factor”
notwithstanding) were implemented
with the intent to keep Ashley out of
the institutions Peace refers to. Concerns about surgery risk are no longer
relevant. Direct harms to her related to
being de-sexualized (by breast bud and
uterus removal) and infantilized (by
height-stunting hormones) are hard to
substantiate for Ashley, whose cognitive capacity will not develop beyond
that of a three month old.
Having clarified these points, I am
struck by Peace’s call for solidarity to
protect the civil rights of people who
face discrimination on the basis of
a disability. This involves educating

ourselves about our own blind spots
and biases. I’m all for that. But I am
not convinced that Ashley and Terri
Schiavo are victims of discrimination
based on a disability.
One definition of discriminate is
“to make a distinction in favor of
or against a person or thing on the
basis of the group, class, or category
to which the person or thing belongs rather than according to actual
merit” (www.dictionary.com). Peace
gives a good example of this in the
movie Million Dollar Baby, when
the main character’s wish for death
over permanent disability is actualized, evoking cheers from the theater
audience. These moviegoers displayed
a common disability-based prejudice
in our individualistic society: the belief
that anyone would prefer death over
a life of paralysis and dependence on
others. If the societal shared belief
was, instead, that people who become
paralyzed should focus on what they
can do and get the help they need to
Cont. on page 10
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Case Presentation

O

ne of the regular features of
the Newsletter is the presentation
of a case considered by an ethics
committee and an analysis of the
ethical issues involved. Readers are
both encouraged to comment on the
case or analysis and to submit other
cases that their ethics committee has
dealt with. In all cases, identifying
information about patients and others
in the case should only be provided with
the permission of the patient. Unless
otherwise indicated, our policy is not
to identify the submitter or institution.
Cases and comments should be sent
to MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or
MHECN, the Law & Health Care
Program, University of Maryland
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St.,
Baltimore, MD 21201.

Case study from
a Maryland
Hospital NICU*

B

aby G is a male infant who was
born at 23 weeks gestation, weighing 540 grams. He was transferred to
a Level Three neonatal intensive care
unit (NICU) at a Maryland hospital
on continuous mandatory ventilation.
Over the next three weeks, Baby G
suffered from multiple maladies including repeated pulmonary hemorrhage,
intermittent need for high frequency
oscillatory ventilation and multiple
blood product transfusions, a Grade
Three bilateral intraventricular (brain)
hemorrhage, and intestinal perforation requiring placement of a drain
and multiple antibiotics. Unable to
take formula or fluids by mouth, Baby
G receives total parental nutrition
through a central IV line. He needs
abdominal surgery to correct the intestinal perforation, but in his current
condition is a very poor surgical risk.
He is receiving opioid medication for
pain and sedation.
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Relations between Baby G's parents
appear strained. They are both unemployed and caring for a two year-old
daughter. The baby’s father seldom
visits the hospital. The gravity of Baby
G’s condition is explained to them.
Based solely on gestational age and
weight at birth, survival estimates for
Baby G range from 12% to 33%. For
infants with his degree of morbidity
who survive, the chance of major disability during infancy is 80% or more.
The parents are given the option of
withdrawing life-sustaining treatments
and focusing on comfort care. Baby
G’s mother insists that he receive full
support, including full code status. She
states that the baby’s survival is up to
“God’s will.”
The neonatologist consults the
ethics committee regarding whether
any of the life support interventions
can be withheld (e.g., CPR attempts,
blood products, medications to support
blood pressure, abdominal surgery) or
withdrawn (e.g., ventilator) based on
medical ineffectiveness criteria.
*Details of this case were modified
to protect confidentiality.

Comments from a
Pediatric Critical &
Palliative Care
Physician

P

ediatric cases involving medical
futility are often difficult for all
involved. Physicians may feel that
they are providing medically inappropriate care which violates their professional responsibilities. Families may
feel that where there is life, there is
hope and wish to continue sustaining a
life even though the chances of a good
outcome are miniscule. Nursing staff
struggle as they witness the suffering
of the infant or child hour by hour at
the bedside, suffering which they feel
will be to no good end.

The greatest difficulties in such
cases arise because determining
prognosis in pediatrics, particularly in
neonatology, can be difficult. The case
described mentions a 12-33% chance
of survival and an 80% chance of
major disability in those who survive.
Families, and some physicians, have
difficulty interpreting such statistics
and applying them to the individual’s
situation. A family might listen to the
above explanation and interpret that
their child has a 20% chance of being
absolutely normal, whereas the actual
number is at best a 2-6% chance of
an outcome ranging from minimal to
moderate disability.
Yet many parents might decide that
a 6% chance is worth taking. The
healthcare team’s perspective, however, is influenced by the degree of
suffering they have seen in similar
children who fall into that other 94%
who die or have severe disabilities.
It is hard to argue with a family who
might rationally choose to fight on
against very small odds, but the team
often gets frustrated with what they
see as an irrational hope for a miracle.
In light of such uncertainty, how
does one define “futility”? There is a
general consensus in law and in ethics that physicians are not obligated
to provide “medically ineffective
therapy.” A patient cannot walk into
a neurosurgeon’s office and demand
surgery for an inoperable brain tumor
––the surgeon can rightfully say “I
can’t fix this.” In many cases, however, it becomes difficult to determine
what is truly ineffective.
Authors have attempted to determine different types of futility to help
clarify the language that clinicians use.
“Physiologic futility” means therapies
which are simply unable to achieve a
certain goal. As an example, continuing resuscitation attempts for more
than an hour of asystole will not be
able to achieve the goal of restoring
a heartbeat. In such a case, there is

no need for the healthcare team to get
the family’s permission before stopping CPR—there is simply nothing
more they can do. Our neonatal case
does not entirely meet the definition of
physiologic futility, as the ventilator in
this case is quite successfully sustaining breathing and circulation; however, it may be possible that pursuing
abdominal surgery for the perforation
would be obviously more risky than
beneficial and there is no requirement
to offer it if this is the case.
“Quantitative futility” has been
proposed as an alternative, based on a
calculation of the odds of a successful outcome. A 1% chance of success
is often cited as a reasonable point
at which a clinician could claim a
therapy is futile. Yet many families
might still wish to persevere in the
face of such odds.
“Qualitative futility” is the term used
when the outcome, from the patient’s
perspective, will be such a poor quality of life that it is not worth pursuing
the treatments. Both quantitative and
qualitative futility assessments include
value judgments to some degree (what
is too poor a quality of life or too low
a risk of success?) and patients and
families therefore typically share in
the decision making about how aggressively to pursue life-sustaining
measures when these issues are raised.
Because of the difficulty in determining what is truly futile, many
recent policies regarding futile or
medically ineffective therapies have
taken a procedural approach to these
issues rather than attempting to somehow define futile.1 Such an approach
sets up a “due process” for resolving
disputes whenever a clinician and
patient or patient’s surrogate disagree
about whether it is worth pursuing aggressive measures. Most such policies
contain requirements for two physicians to agree that the therapy is not
indicated, for an independent review to
take place (usually done by a hospital
ethics or medical review committee),
for the patient or family to be informed

in writing that the review is taking
place, and for the option of transfer
to another provider or facility to be
offered. Most also impose a waiting
period before any therapies can be
discontinued. Texas is the first state
to have such a statewide procedure for
futility disputes,2 and there is ongoing debate about whether the process
is fair to patients and families. Many
argue that a medical review committee
associated with the hospital is much
more likely to be biased in favor of the
clinicians and that “futility” arguments
are often used by clinicians as a trump
card when they no longer wish to provide expensive, ongoing care.3, 4
The Maryland Healthcare Decisions Act states that physicians are not
required to provide ineffective therapies that would not, with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, prevent an
impending death. This does not mean,
however, that therapies can be unilaterally withheld or withdrawn because a
prognosis is poor. The attorney general has stated that even if the patient has
a fatal illness, a physician cannot write
a unilateral “Do not attempt resuscitation” order if resuscitation has a reasonable chance of restoring the patient
to his or her current condition (http://
www.oag.state.md.us/Healthpol/dnrauth.pdf). In addition, life-sustaining
measures cannot be withdrawn while
options for transfer are being explored,
with no definite limits set on how long
a time period this encompasses.
So what is the team to do in the case
of the unfortunate infant described
here? Sometimes the best path is to
step away from trying to convince
the family that aggressive treatments
should be withdrawn and focus instead
on working to build an alliance with
the parents. The health care providers
should do the following:
• Try to understand better what
awaiting “God’s will” means to the
parents.
• Meet with the parents frequently so
that they get a good idea of the trajectory of the child’s illness.

• Help the parents find support
through hospital staff such as social
work or chaplaincy, their extended
family or their own spiritual providers.
• Insist on treating the infant’s suffering with pain or sedative medications if necessary, while waiting to see
what the outcome will be.
• Let the parents know that they and
their child will be treated with respect,
no matter what course of action is
taken.
• Bring in a mediator such as the
hospital ethics committee. Provide debriefings or other support for staff who
are struggling with their own moral
distress over the case.
If the family and healthcare team can
avoid developing entrenched adversarial positions, and instead work together
to negotiate what is in the best interest
of the child, the right course of action
may become more apparent with time.
It is possible that the family will never
agree to have aggressive measures
discontinued, but if the therapy is truly
“futile” then the current status will
likely not continue indefinitely.
Wynne Morrison, MD
Director, Pediatric Critical Care
Medicine Fellowship Program
Attending Physician,
Critical Care and the Pediatric
Advanced Care Team
The Children's Hospital
of Philadelphia
Department of Anesthesiology &
Critical Care Medicine
University of Pennsylvania
School of Medicine
Philadelphia, PA
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1. Clark PA. Building a policy in pediatrics for medical futility. Pediatr Nurs.
Mar-Apr 2001;27(2):180-184.

2. Fine RL, Mayo TW. Resolution of futility by due process: early experience with
the Texas Advance Directives Act. Ann
Intern Med. May 6 2003;138(9):743-746.
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Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 

Case Presentation
Cont. from page 6

eth. Sep-Oct 2006;6(5):19-21; discussion
W30-12.
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Comments from a
Pediatrician and
Ethics Consultant

T

he neonatologist raises a good
question––does it have to be all or
nothing, or can one choose a few treatments and not others for this baby, on
the basis of sound ethical reasoning?
Withholding and withdrawing treatments is always associated with a lot
of angst and emotional heartbreak, not
just for the parents, but also for the
health care providers. Ethics consultation can provide an important source of
moral support for the staff, and a voice
of reason for all who are involved at
this pivotal juncture.
Since the parents have been given a
choice of comfort care, it shows that
the medical team clearly feels that the
future is too grim to continue aggressive treatments. Perhaps a better way
to resolve this dilemma would be for
the medical team to make the “hard
decision,” explain to the parents their
reasoning for suggesting the shift from
life-prolonging treatments to comfort
care, and ask for the parents’ agreement. If the parents do not disagree,
life-prolonging treatments can be
stopped or withheld. In my opinion,
asking parents to make the “hard
decision” to stop treatments that are
prolonging their baby’s life is too great
a burden for them to carry alone.
Before deciding on withholding and/
or withdrawing other life-sustaining
treatments, it would be prudent to have
an open, candid meeting with both the
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parents to set reasonable, mutually
agreed upon goals of therapy that are
clearly in the baby’s best interest. If
the physician/parent meeting is not
productive, an ethics committee consult can help by clarifying short- and
long-term goals, helping coordinate
care, and mediating conflicts. Although these situations are difficult at
best, major conflicts can be avoided
by getting everyone concerned on the
same page from the beginning.
Physicians are under no obligation
to provide treatments that are medically ineffective or ethically wrong.
Treatments that are medically ineffective as judged by poor response
from a trial of therapy can be withheld
on the basis of medical ineffectiveness. As stipulated in the Maryland
Health Care Decisions Act, this can
be achieved by two physicians, one of
them being the attending physician,
documenting in the chart the ineffectiveness of those treatments before
stopping them, and then informing the
parents of this decision.
CPR can be clearly withheld on the
basis of futility. If the patient continues to worsen despite the present
intensive support and treatment, and
then has a cardiopulmonary arrest,
clearly a CPR attempt is of no avail
and could even be considered unethical.
The more difficult decision is that
of discontinuing the ventilator. Years
ago, the baby in this case study would
have had no chance of survival. Now,
it may be possible to keep this baby
alive to be discharged from the NICU,
albeit severely impaired. The question of whether it is right to keep this
baby alive with the technology that we
have is an unanswered question. What
criteria warrant choosing death over
prolonging life with hi-tech medical
interventions? Likelihood of death?
Likelihood of severe neurological im-

pairment? Degree of pain and suffering
endured? Inability to meaningfully
interact? When uncertainty remains
about a baby’s prognosis, deference is
given to the parents to decide whether
the primary goal of care should be life
prolongation or comfort. If stopping
a given therapy is likely to cause this
baby’s death, according to Maryland
law, it cannot be stopped without
parental agreement. So, the ventilator must be continued as long as the
parents request this. Again, an ethics
consult can be very helpful here. Setting clear goals on a reasonable length
of time to continue artificial support
therapies, focusing on what is being
done to care for the baby, and gently
explaining to the parents signs that the
baby’s condition is deteriorating can
help the parents come to terms with
a poor prognosis. The parents should
receive adequate time to process
information given to them, along with
empathic counseling and pastoral care
to support them through this process.
In cases like these, there is often
frustration and angst among the NICU
staff related to inflicting pain and suffering on a baby without a reasonable
hope of survival or minimally acceptable quality of life for the baby. The
ethics committee should evaluate how
the staff coped in response to this case,
and explore ways to help them sort
through the emotions, questions, and
concerns this care-giving experience
may have evoked. Of course, such
support should also be available to the
baby’s parents.
Shahid Aziz, MD
Ethics Consultant
Pediatrician
Chair, Harbor Hospital
Ethics Committee

Considering Baby
Doe Rules

I

t is a truism that law and ethics,
while usually complementary, are
not synonymous. An ethics committee
that always says, “Well, that’s it then”
after an attorney’s pronouncement
is itself ethically impoverished. Yet,
law has a claim to respectful attention
in the consultation process, for law
reflects a distillation of social attitudes
about the limits of morally acceptable action. And, of course, an ethics
committee will not be taken seriously
if, cocooned within its own immunity
from suit, it simply ignores concerns
about liability.
At some point in the discussion
about Baby G, someone might bring
up “the Baby Doe rules.” This will
stop the conversation, as clinicians
worry that, even if a treatment meets
state criteria for medical ineffectiveness, withholding or withdrawing it
will get them into legal trouble.
The federal law commonly known
as the Baby Doe rules originated in
controversy over parental decisions,
with physician acquiescence, to forgo
surgery and other interventions that
might have preserved the lives of
infants with Down syndrome and
other disabilities. First adopted by
the Department of Health and Human
Services in 1983, restrictive regulations directly applicable to hospitals
were struck down by the courts. Then,
in 1984, Congress amended the Child
Abuse Protection and Treatment
Act (CAPTA) to label as “medical
neglect” some decisions to forgo
treatment. The Department elaborated
on the statute through regulations and
interpretive guidelines.
The policymakers faced a dilemma.
They wanted to stop infants from
being left to die solely because of

others’ judgments about future quality
of life with a disability. Yet, they also
understood that inflexibly mandating treatment could turn out to be a
cruel disservice to dying patients.
The result, as often happens when the
words of the law are brought to bear
on a problem with a myriad of variations and gradations, is recourse to
ambiguity. The effect of the ambiguous language is to allow the ethically
sound process envisioned by the two
physician commentators on the case.
The CAPTA amendments condition certain federal financial aid on a
state’s having a system for responding to reports of medical neglect,
“including instances of withholding
of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.” The “withholding of
medically indicated treatment” occurs
when one or more of the forgone
treatments “will be most likely to be
effective in ameliorating or correcting all [of an infant’s] life-threatening conditions.” This likelihood is
to be judged through “the treating
physician’s or physicians’ reasonable
medical judgment.” To be considered
in this exercise of judgment is whether a treatment would “merely prolong
dying, not be effective in ameliorating
or correcting all of the infant's lifethreatening conditions, or otherwise
be futile in terms of the survival of
the infant.” Nutrition, hydration, and
medication are to be provided so long
as they are deemed “appropriate.”
Under the Department’s guidelines,
“reasonable medical judgment will
be formed on the basis of knowledge
about the condition(s) involved,
the degree of inevitability of death,
the probable effect of any potential

treatments, the projected time period
within which death will probably occur, and other pertinent factors.” In
Baby G’s case, as the commentators
suggest, these are the very factors
that ought to be part of the discussion between the treatment team and
Baby G’s mother (and father too, if he
returns to play a role in the decision
making).
To summarize: If the exercise of
reasonable medical judgment is that
continued ventilation is futile in terms
of Baby G’s survival (if, for example,
abdominal surgery is ruled out and the
intestinal perforation itself will likely
result in death), the Baby Doe rules
do not bar withdrawal of the ventilator. The same kind of judgment may
be applied to the question of code
status. Opioid medication ought to be
continued indefinitely, however, as
appropriate palliation. Likewise, total
parenteral nutrition ought to be continued unless and until it is deemed inappropriate in terms of Baby G’s present
well-being. Finally, the physicians
ought not to use the high probability
of future disability as an argument
to try to change the mother’s mind.
To do so would be inconsistent with
the present-oriented framework for
discussion that the Baby Doe rules
mandate.
Jack Schwartz, JD
Assistant Attorney General
Director of Health Policy
MD Attorney General’s Office
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RETALIATION FOR REQUESTING
ETHICS CONSULTATION?

etaliatory consequences
against health care professionals (HCPs) who speak
up about ethically worrisome conditions or practices in their institution
have reportedly included threats, peer
rejection, demotion, and reprimand.
Do HCPs who request ethics consults
face retaliation? Danis and colleagues
(2007) report on a survey of nurses
and social workers in Massachusetts,
Maryland, Ohio and California undertaken to determine if they experienced
or feared retaliation for requesting an
ethics consult. They found that among
those reporting access to an ethics
consultation service, about 11% had
experienced or observed other staff
experience retaliation for requesting
an ethics consult. About a third, while

not experiencing or observing retaliation, considered it to be a realistic fear.
However, fear of retaliation was not
associated with the likelihood or frequency of requesting an ethics consult.
The authors suggest that because the
likelihood of requesting an ethics
consult was not affected by the fear of
retaliation, this may indicate that ethics consultation offers a “sanctioned
and safe venue in the healthcare workplace for raising ethical questions,”
and that “[p]erhaps ethics committees
and consultants have succeeded in
creating a forum for discussion of difficult ethical questions that levels the
playing field and allows open discussion of moral issues” (p. 33). Findings
from this study raise questions about
the reputation of the ethics committee

within an institution, and its perceived
accessibility. Of note in Danis and
colleagues’ study is that about 52%
of respondents (licensed registered
nurses or social workers with at least
10 hours a week of active patient care)
reported not having access to an ethics
consultation service. Considering that
an ethics consult service may be one
method of leveling power hierarchies
within an institution, findings from
this survey have relevance to those interested in improving their institution’s
ethical climate.

of death. Discriminating against Mr.
Bauby based on his disability would
have caused him to suffer, and would
have deprived him and the world of his
beautiful book and subsequent movie.
No evidence has been presented that
the “Ashley Treatment” has caused or
will cause Ashley to suffer (assuming
adequate post-op pain management),
or that it limits her potential to flourish. This is because Ashley has a very
limited experiential range.
Thus, the distinction I’m making is
not between physical and cognitive
disability, but in the individual’s level
of cognitive potential. Individuals who
are neurologically devastated such that
they will never attain self-awareness
or think for themselves (with Ashley X
on one end of this continuum and Terri

Schiavo on the other) seem to warrant a
different obligation from society—not
to maximize their potential (since they
have no further cognitive potential to
develop), but to treat them with respect,
care, and dignity. That can be achieved
without concluding that they have
unactualized potential they’re deprived
of accessing due to societal prejudice.
To get serious about disability prejudice and discrimination in our society,
I think we need to get clearer about
our use and understanding of the terms
disability and disability discrimination.

REFERENCE
Danis, M., Farrar, A., Grady, C., Taylor, C., & O’Donnell, P. (2007). Does
fear of retaliation deter requests for
ethics consultation? Med Health Care
and Philos, 11(1), 27-34.

Tarzian's Response
Cont. from page 5

maximize their abilities, perhaps more
would have despaired at the character’s
decision to end her life, and she may
have come to a different decision about
ending her life.
Such an alternative view is poignantly portrayed in the movie, The Diving
Bell and the Butterfly, which depicts
French journalist and author Jean
Dominique Bauby’s experiences after
suffering a massive stroke and finding
himself in a “locked-in” syndrome. His
cognition was intact, but his body was
completely paralyzed. His only method
of communicating was by blinking his
left eye. Bauby’s merit is well-recognized by his caregivers, who devise
a way for him to dictate the book he
eventually writes about his experiences,
pushing him beyond his initial thoughts
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Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
april
24

Practical Clinical Ethics. Sponsored by Harbor Hospital’s Ethics Committee. Harbor Hospital’s Baum
Auditorium at 3001 South Hanover Street, Baltimore, MD. For more information, contact Sally Lewis at
410-350-8218.

29

Ethical Dilemmas in Research Involving Children: Damned whether you do or you don’t. SUNY Downstate
Medical Center, Brooklyn, NY. For more information, call Alice Herb at (718) 270-2752 or e-mail aherb@
downstate.edu.

may
6-7

The Patient Alone: Making Health Care Choices For Patients Without Surrogates. Sponsored by American
Health Decisions. John Hancock Hotel & Conference Center, Boston, Massachusetts. For more information,
visit http://www.ahd.org/conference.html.

8–9

Ethical Challenges in Surgical Innovation. Sponsored by the Cleveland Clinic. InterContinental Hotel,
Cleveland, OH. For more information, call (216) 932 3448, or visit http://www.clevelandclinicmeded.com/
live/courses/2008/ethicalsurgery08/faculty.htm.

13–14

Seeing Making Healing: Art, the Arts, and Creativity in Medicine and the Medical Humanities: The Sixth
Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Medical Humanities Consortium. Carnegie Museum of Art, Pittsburgh,
PA. For more information, call (412) 647-5700.

14

More is Not Always Better: Seeking Value in End-of-Life Care. Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of
Ethics Committees. 2008 Stonewall Resort, Morgantown, VA. MHECN members receive a 20% registration
discount. For more information, call (877) 209-8086 or e-mail cjamison@hsc.wvu.edu.

June
2–6

The Future of Bioethics—How It Began. Where It’s Going. The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Intensive
Bioethics Course. For more information, visit http://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/courses/ibc/ibc2008.
htm.

14

How Do I Determine if My Patient has Capacity to Make Medical Decisions? Assessing Decision Making
Capacity. Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning, University of San Francisco. San Francisco, CA. For more
information, visit http://www.cpmc.org/services/ethics/seminar.html.

july
17–19

Nursing Ethics Health Care Policy: Bridging Local, National & International Perspectives. Yale University
School of Nursing, 100 Church St. South, New Haven, CT. For more information, visit http://nursing.yale.
edu/Centers/International/EthicsConference/.

14-17

Building clinical ethics capacity, bettering patient care. Clinical Ethics Summer Institute, Hamilton Health
Sciences. Hamilton, ON (Canada). For more information, visit http://www.clinicalethics.ca, or e-mail
info_clinicalethics@hhsc.ca.
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